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Abstract

This article explores the main features of exceptions to enforcement under Article V of the NYC,
including its exhaustive and discretionary natures. It then specifically provides an overview of
narrow judicial control over the grounds for refusing enforcement under the Article V of the NYC.
It points out the fundamental principles of the provision in determining the enforceability of
international arbitral awards. Then this article will occasionally refer to international arbitral
cases in some jurisdictions, such as the United States, France and Switzerland. It is noted that
courts and legislatures in those jurisdictions have moved towards pro-enforcement policy to
questions of recognition and enforcement arising under Article V of the NYC. Therefore, this
approach is a good signal and a promising development to promote the finality and enforeability
of foreign arbitral awards in international commercial arbitration. This approach can also be a
good lesson for the Indonesian judiciary system in relation to the enforcement and recognition of
international arbitral awards in the future.
Keywords: international commercial arbitration, Article V of the NYC, refusal of enforcement,
pro enforcement bias, finality and enforceability, foreign arbitral award.
Abstrak
Artikel ini menganalisis tentang alasan-alasan penolakan pengakuan dan pelaksanaan putusan
arbitrase internasional yang diatur di dalam Pasal V Konvensi New York 1958, termasuk
sifat limitatif dan diskresi dari ketentuan tersebut. Beberapa putusan pengadilan di berbagai
negara seperti Amerika Serikat dan Perancis menunjukkan adanya tendensi untuk menerapkan
ketentuan Pasal V Konvensi New York secara restriktif. Fenomena ini mencerminkan adanya
kecenderungan dari berbagai negara untuk menerapkan prinsip ‘pro enforcement’ terhadap
pelaksanaan putusan arbitrase internasional sehingga lebih memberikan jaminan kepastian
hukum terhadap pengakuan/pelaksanaan putusan arbitrase internasional di berbagai negara
yang telah meratifikasi Konvensi New York. Penerapan prinsip ‘pro enforcement’ juga dapat
memberikan paradigma baru bagi Pengadilan di Indonesia terkait dengan pengakuan dan
pelaksanaan putusan arbitrase internasional.
Kata kunci: arbitrase komersial internasional, Pasal V Konvensi New York, penolakan
pelaksanaan putusan arbitrase internasional, prinsip ‘pro enforcement’, finalitas dan kekuatan
mengikat putusan arbitrase internasional.
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The exceptions to the enforcement under Article V of the New York Convention
1958 regarding Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter:
the NYC) were potentially a source of serious concern. The court’s expansive
interpretations of these exceptions gave rise to an abrupt denial of the finality of
an award. It was generally agreed that exclusive exceptions to enforcement under
Article V of the Convention and the recognition of the finality and enforceability of
the awards under Article III exemplify the pro-enforcement policy. Further, Article
IV of the Convention promotes restrictive procedure of enforcement by discouraging
erroneous conditions of enforcement and establishing prima facie evidence of the
enforceability of the awards. This means that the defences opposing enforcement
should be construed narrowly and exhaustively in favour of enforcement.1

The pro-enforcement policy prevents the abuse of court’s process domestically.
Merits review of an award is an abuse of court’s process because it undermines
the finality and enforceability of the award. The prevention of the abuse of court’s
discretion generally promotes honor for the arbitral tribunals’ role in deciding and
terminating disputes. Increased pro-enforcement policy leads to decreased court’s
interventions and ultimately an increase in the finality and enforceability of foreign
awards. This will also promote and support the implementation of the competencecompetence principle.

Privileging the pro-enforcement policy will ensure award enforcement, lower
national or parochial inclination and local protectionism. Thus, it will promote the
delocalization of awards as an impact of internationalization and globalization.
The ongoing challenge for the national courts is to put in place a harmonious and
effective interaction between the pro-enforcement policy and enforcement controls
of arbitral awards. Accordingly, this paper examines the judicial approach regarding
residual discretion to enforce foreign awards notwithstanding the existence of the
public policy exception. It then analyzes Indonesian courts and other jurisdiction
approaches in enforcing foreign awards on the grounds of public policy. Prior to
addressing these issues, it is convenient to examine the preliminary issue of whether
Article V of the Convention indicates that the pro-enforcement policy favours the
presumptive enforceability of foreign awards.

II. Article V of The New York Convention – Enforceability of Foreign
Awards and Exceptions to Enforcement
A. Discretionary Nature of Article V of the NYC

The discretionary nature of Article V complements the pro-enforcement bias
of the NYC. The ‘permissive’ nature of this provision demonstrates that it is not
mandatory thus it preserves the courts’ discretion to enforce the awards. This is
exemplified from the use of the term ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’ under Article V of the
Convention. The existence of grounds for refusal of enforcement may not necessarily
lead to non-enforcement of the awards. The court has discretionary power to allow or
refuse enforcement. Only if the existence of the grounds for non-enforcement would
seriously injure fundamental justice and the morality of the enforcement, the state
1
Richard Garnett, “International Arbitration Law: Progress towards Harmonization,” Melbourne Journal of International Law Vol. 3 Issue 2 (Septenber-December 2002): 400.
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may suffice to justify non-enforcement.
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The discretionary nature of Article V of the NYC exemplifies an autonomy sphere
of courts to exercise a certain level of personal judgment and assessment.2 The
courts’ discretionary power is derived from the given standards of the grounds for
non-enforcement under Article V. 3 The absence of a standard definition and scope of
grounds for challenging the enforcement of arbitral awards under Article V has led
to vague and abstract standards of application. Discretion can also be deliberately
promoted by a vague linguistic structure, such as when a rule contains open texture
words requiring an element of judgment before they can be applied such as ‘public
policy.’ This may leave room for the courts applying the rule to exercise discretion.

However, does this also mean that the discretionary powers of the municipal courts
are unlimited? Although judges have discretionary power to refuse enforcement or
annul the awards, they are nevertheless not obliged to assume that their discretion is
unlimited. The court’s discretion is not absolute since it is related to the interpretation
of a given standard within a legal rule in order to apply it. Accordingly, in exercising
its discretion, the court must take into consideration some factors in order to achieve
justice and fairness. With regard to the defect of procedure as the grounds for refusal
enforcement, ‘the seriousness of the defect’4 should be taken into account in the
application of the discretion to set aside or to not enforce the awards.5 Further, the
judges may also refuse to apply discretionary power to refuse enforcement or set
aside an award if it could create a ‘procedural injustice’ or ‘unjustifiably erode the
binding force and finality of the awards’.6 In MINE v. Guinea7, the court may require
contravention of the material justice in order to justify the court’s discretion in a
decision on annulment and enforcement of awards.8 Other cases also suggest that the
court has discretionary power to determine whether the violation of public policy
exception may justify non-enforcement. In MGM Production Group, Inc. v. Aeroflot
Russian Airlines,9 the court required contravention of the most basic notion of morality
and justice to justify non-enforcement based on the public policy exception.10.
B. Basic Concepts of the Exhaustive Nature of Article V of the NYC

It has been accepted that the procedural defence to oppose enforcement under

2
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. (USA) v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA)
(Egypt), 508 F. 2d 205 (2nd Cir. 1974), United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 23 December 1974,
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1 (1976).
3
D J Galligan, Discretionary Powers (USA: Clarendon Press Oxford, 1986), p. 14.
4
Carolyn B. Lamm and Frank Spoorenberg, “The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards under The
New York Convention, Recent Development,” http://www.steelbee.net/THE%20ENFORCEMENT%20
OF%20FOREIGN%20ARBITRAL%20AWARDS%20UNDER%20THE%20NEW%20YORK%20CONVENTION.pdf, accessed 24 June 2014.
5
Ibid.
6
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Dispute Settlement, International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Post-Awards Remedies and Procedures (United Nations:
New York and Geneva, 2003), ,p. 14, accessed 24 December 2014, .http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add7_en.pdf.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
MGM Production Group, Inc. v. Aeroflot Russian Airlines, WL234871 2004 (2nd Cir (NY) cited in A
Redfern, et.al., International Arbitration (USA: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 457.
10
See Parsons & Whittemore, cited in Gary Born (1), International Commercial Arbitration : Commentary and Materials (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 825.
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Article V of the NYC is exhaustive. Accordingly, the grounds for enforcement refusal
that are enshrined in Article V of the Convention are exclusive. Thus, judicially created
grounds for non-enforcement is inadmissible.11 This also complements the proenforcement policy of the Convention. The grounds for challenging the enforcement
of an award, as prescribed in Article V of the New York Convention, embodies three
basic features: (1) the grounds are exhaustive; (2) there is no review of the merits
of the award; (3) the burden of proof is upon the respondent.12 With regard to proenforcement bias of the Convention, a narrow approach to the grounds for refusing
enforcement could discourage ‘unnecessary’ refusal of enforcement of international
awards.13 No additional grounds for non-enforcement or annulment are permitted to
be provided by the parties in international arbitration agreement.

The exhaustive nature of Article V of the Convention also means that the defence to
oppose enforcement should not be onerously applied with regard to the enforcement
of international awards. The exclusive grounds for challenging enforcement under
Article V complements the NYC’s pro-enforcement policy. Accordingly, additional basis
beyond the scope of Article V of the Convention may not justify non-enforcement.
This leads to the perception that while arbitration acknowledges freedom of contract
principle the exclusivity of Article V is nevertheless a significant limit on the parties
to contractually expand the grounds for challenging enforcement or setting aside the
awards. Accordingly, neither the courts nor the parties of an international arbitration
have legal authority to create or modify a new ground for non-enforcement which is
not provided for under the NYC. The parties have no rights to contractually modify
grounds for non-enforcement and annulment of international awards.14 Therefore,
the judicially created grounds for the refusal of enforcement under the guise of the
public policy exception will undermine the exclusivity of Article V of the Convention
and the pro-enforcement bias.
With regard to the scope of review of international awards, the exhaustive nature
of Article V of the NYC also means that the scope of judicial review cannot be expanded
or modified by the enforcement courts. Since arbitration is based on a contractual
agreement and party autonomy principle, neither expandable judicial review
authority nor supplemental review should be permitted because the basic principle
of arbitration is party autonomy. 15Accordingly, no review of the merits of the awards
is permissible under the exclusive nature of Article V of the Convention. Although
the exceptions under Article V (1) (a) have to be proven by the respondent, their
application should be construed narrowly and mostly concerned with serious cases
only. A restrictive approach to Article V is designed to promote the pro-enforcement
11
The phrase ‘may be refused ...only if’ under Article V of the NYC constitutes limitation enumeration
of the grounds for refusal enforcement of arbitral awards. Accordingly, the enforcement court may not
refuse enforcement on the basis of a ground that is not enshrined in the Convention. See Albert Jan van
den Berg (1), “Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Annulled in Russia, Case Comment on Court of Appeal of
Amsterdam,” Journal of International Arbitration Vol. 2 No. 27 (2010): 185, accessed 24 June 2015, http://
www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12771025582040/ajb_in_joia_27-2_2.pdf.
12
Albert Jan Van den Berg (2), “Why Are Some Awards Not Enforceable?” in New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration and Beyond, edited by Albert Jan Van Den Berg, (ICCA International Arbitration Congress, The Hague : Kluwer International Law, 2005), pp. 291-292.
13
Agrimpex SA v. J.F. Braun & Sons Inc., Decision No. 88, p. 269 .(Areios Pagos Supreme Court 1977),
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration IV (1979).
14
Phillipe Pinsolle, “Recent Significant French Judicial Decisions Involving International Arbitration,”
in Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation, The Fordham Papers, edited by Arthur W.
Rovine, (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), pp. 109, 118-119.
15
Galligan, op.cit., pp. 385, 8-9.
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policy of the NYC in order to achieve the finality and enforceability of the awards.

The exhaustive nature of Article V (1) can be seen in the case of Encyclopaedia
Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica,16 in which the appeal court held that
the grounds for enforcement refusal on the basis that the arbitrators’ exceeded
their power was inadmissible since this ground was not included as the exclusive
grounds for refusing enforcement under Article V of the NYC.17 However, in certain
cases, the courts found it difficult in applying the Convention’s fundamental principle
that it supersedes domestic law concerning the enforcement of foreign awards.18
Consequently, they do not directly refer to the NYC but prefer to refer to grounds
under their own domestic law, later confirmed by corresponding grounds enumerated
in Article V of the Convention. This would leave no room of reference for expansive
grounds denying enforcement under the law of the forum. Accordingly, this may
challenge the exhaustive nature of Article V of the Convention.
The exhaustive list of grounds for non-enforcement, as set forth in Article V of
the NYC, exemplifies restrictive or limited exceptions to enforcement. This raises two
points. Firstly, the parties cannot expand the grounds for judicial review based on
contractual agreement. Secondly, it implies restrictive judicial intervention of the
grounds for reviewing an award. Judicial review with regard to non-enforcement
and annulment of the awards is extremely limited, thus it cannot be expanded by
the parties’ agreement and the broad scope of judicial intervention. Accordingly, no
additional exceptions to enforcement can be imposed under the guise of the public
policy exception. From this point, what pertains to public policy does not necessarily
include other grounds, which are not covered by Article V of the Convention. For
instance, manifest disregard of the law may not fall within the public policy exception.
A restrictive scope of review of the public policy exception discourages the court to
refuse enforcement of international awards on the basis of arbitrator’s error of law
or of fact or manifest disregard of the law. An open texture of public policy exception
should be applied narrowly in order to uphold the finality and enforceability of
international awards.

Although defences opposing enforcement19 have been internationally
standardised20 and adopted in a national statutory basis, they should be construed
narrowly. Mere violations of procedural defence21 and of substantive defence22 may
not necessarily justify non-enforcement. The exhaustive list of grounds opposing
enforcement means that the application of these defences are limited to specific
grounds, which can be deemed a ‘serious defect’ in the enforcement of the awards.23

16
Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 403 F. 3d 85 1136-1143 (2nd Cir, 2005),
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration XXX (2005).
17
Ibid.
18
Albert Jan Van den Berg (3), The New York Arbitration Convention 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial
Interpretation (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1981), p. 268.
19
This consists of two major challenges: the challenge for refusing enforcement; and the challenge to
set aside an award.
20
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 10 June 1958,
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, No. 4739, art. 5.
21
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 5 (1).
22
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 5 (2).
23
Any exceeding power and legal error made by the arbitrator would not always justify non-enforcement. In Lesotho Highlands v. Impreglio, the court held that mere error of law, i.e. error about the currency
of the award, may not be justified as an excess of power. See, William W Park (1), “The Nature of Arbitral
Authority: A Comment on Lesotho Highlands,” Arbitration International 21 (2005): 483,485, accessed 24
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The contravention of public policy may only be accepted in ‘serious cases only’.24
Accordingly, not all public policy falls within the concept of public policy exception.25
In Renusagar Power Co Ltd. (India) v. General Electric Co. (USA) and the International
Chamber of Commerce, Paris26, for example, the Indian court held that mere violation
of the law of India could not be deemed as contravention of public policy. The
enforcement of foreign awards would be refused on the basis of the public policy
exception if it contravenes: (i) the fundamental policy of Indian law; (ii) the interests
of India; (iii) justice or morality. This decision is in favour of restrictive standards of
review of the public policy exception.

In Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc.27, the US courts also applied a
restrictive approach to the public policy exception. In this case, the meaning of public
policy is construed narrowly and applied only where enforcement would violate the
most basic notions of morality and justice. Similarly, in Libyan American Oil Company
(LIAMCO) v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Republic Jamahirya, (formerly Libyan Arab
Republic), 28 the US District Court held that mere violation of state’s public policy
may not necessarily justify non-enforcement based on the public policy exception. In
other cases, public policy only pertains to ‘explicit public policy’ that is well defined
and dominant, thus the determination of public policy should be based on the legal
precedents instead of from general consideration of supposed public interests.29 The
French court also adopted a similar standard, requiring the violation of international
public policy instead of domestic public policy. Although the concept of international
public policy under Article 1502 (5) of the French Code of Civil Procedure can only
refer to the French conception of international public policy30, it is confined to a
restrictive concept of the public policy defence opposing enforcement. In Societe
Thales Air Defense v. GIE Euromissile et al.,31 for example, the court held that the
violation of public policy must be ‘flagrant, effective and real’32 in order to justify nonenforcement of foreign awards. Accordingly, not all contravention of public policy falls
within the scope of the public policy exception and mere violation of domestic public
policy may not suffice to justify non-enforcement.

June 2015, http://arbitration.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/4/483.
24
Oberlandesgericht of Hamburg, 3 April 1975, in Van den Berg (3), op.cit., p. 365.
25
Hebei Import and Export Corporation v. Polytek Engineering Co.Ltd, 2 HKC 205, 1 HKLRD 652 (HCFA
1999), online http://www.judiciary.gov.hk (website of the Judiciary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China). Also reported in (1999) XXIV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration. The court held that the violation of public policy exists if the award is fundamentally offensive to the
enforcement state’s basic notion of justice.
26
Renusagar Power Co Ltd. (India) v General Electric Co. (USA) and the International Chamber of
Commerce, Paris, 681-738 (Supreme Court of India 1993), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration XX (1995).
27
Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc ,156 F. 3d 310, 315 (2nd Cir. 1988).
28
Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Republic Jamahirya, (formerly Libyan Arab Republic), 248-250 (United States District Court, District Court of Columbia 1980), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration VI (1981).
29
Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutenhoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1445–46 (11th Cir.
1998), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration XXIVa (1999).
30
E. Gaillard and J. Savage, International Commercial Arbitration (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 1648.
31
Societe Thales Air Defense v. GIE Euromissile et al., 94 (2003), Rev.Arb. No 1 (2004).
32
Ibid.
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III. Grounds for Setting Asideo Arbitral Awards –Standard of Review of
Arbitral Awards?

Despite the fact that foreign awards are final and enforceable, they are also
subject to scrutiny restricted of procedural and substantive issues.33 The refusal of
enforcement and the setting aside of the award implies a judicial control over the
awards by the municipal courts of the enforcing states. However, does this mean that
the municipal court can freely review the merits of the awards? For this point, the
right of appeal and the review of the awards should be distinguished. Despite the fact
that both standards aim at reversing the awards, they do have distinct concepts. The
former requires the courts to review the merits of the award, while the latter involves
limited proceeding with regard to whether the procedure applied was formally
correct.34
A. Restrictive Grounds of Review

Article V of the NYC expressly refers to recognition and enforcement, but it is not
specifically confined to the proceeding of setting aside the arbitral awards.35 The NYC
does not specifically set forth grounds for vacating the awards. It has been argued
that exhaustive approach to the grounds for challenging enforcement under Article
V of the Convention does not necessarily be applied to setting aside proceedings.36
Does this mean that the courts are expansively allowed to independently review the
error of facts of the arbitral proceedings? Despite the fact that both the NYC and the
UNCITRAL Model Law remain silent with regard to the judicial review for errors of
fact, the pro-enforcement bias of Article III of the NYC is fundamentally confined to a
limited scope of judicial review of the awards.37

However, the absence of an underlying international standard of exhaustive
grounds for setting aside the award has led to more erroneous grounds for vacating
the awards in various jurisdictions. In the US, for instance, the grounds for setting
aside the awards are not exhaustive since the courts can expansively interpret them.
Section 10 (a) (4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), for instance, may expand
the grounds for vacating the awards on the basis of manifest disregard of the law.
However, it is uncertain whether ‘manifest disregard’ is meant to name a new ground
of review of arbitral awards or it may be shorthand for Section 10 (a) (3) or Section
10 (a) (4) of FAA which authorizes vacatur when arbitrators are ‘guilty of misconduct’
of have ‘exceeded their powers.’ 38 Does this mean that Section 10 of the FAA provides
the judicial review of the errors of fact? Although the FAA does not expressly set forth
this issue, Section 10 (a) (3) of the Act seems loosely open to the possibility for the

33
Tibor Varady, John J. Barcelo III and Arthur T. von Mehren, International Commercial Arbitration: A
Transnational Perspective, 2nd ed. (USA: Thomson/West, 2002), p. 709.
34
Ibid.
35
Grounds for setting aside arbitral awards is adopted in Article 34 of the Model Law which are identical to the grounds for a refusal to enforce and a foreign arbitral award under Article V of the NYC. See
Michael S.C. Hwang and Shaun Lee, “Survey of South East Asian Nations on the Application of the New York
Convention,” Journal of International Arbitration Vol. 25 Issue 6 (2008): 885.
36
Ibid.
37
Mitchell H. Rubinstein, “Altering Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Award,” Michigan State Law
Review Vol. 2 (2006): 235, 252.
38
Robert M. Hall, “Manifest Disregard of the Law As A Basis to Vacate Arbitral Awards After Hall Street
Associates,” (2009), accessed 24 June 2015, http://www.robertmhall.com/articles/ManiDisregardArt.pdf.
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(a) In any of the following cases the US court in and for the district wherein the award
was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party
to the arbitration:
[…]
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehaviour by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
Thus, it would seem that the courts owe any deference to the findings of the
decision that they have reached at after adversary arbitral proceedings. However, in
Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp. (Kyocera I),40 the US District Court denied
the claim of the Kyocera based on errors of fact and of law.41 Further, in pursuing the
narrow approach to the grounds for judicial review of the awards, the US court held
that the review could only be applied in exceptional circumstances. This also means
that the grounds to challenge enforcement would be successful only in ‘extreme cases’
which have created ‘substantial injustice’.42 For example, with regard to error of law or
excess of arbitrators’ power,, these grounds may not justify non-enforcement unless
the tribunal has been so erroneous in its conduct that fundamental justice calls for
it to be corrected.43 Accordingly, the lack of substantial evidence of the tribunal’s
findings of fact and error of law did not justify non-enforcement. Similarly, in Kyocera
Corp v. Prudential Bache Trade Services Inc.,44 the US court held that the contractual
agreement to expand the grounds for judicial review of the award beyond the scope
Ibid.
Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp. (Kyocera I), 130 F 3d 884 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Kyocera
Corp. v. Prudential Bache Trade Services Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003), in Varady, Barcelo III and von
Mehren, op.cit., pp. 770–771.
41
Ibid., p. 771. In this case, the Kyocera claimed that ‘(1) the tribunal’s finding of facts were not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the Tribunal had made errors of law, and (3) there existed various
statutory grounds for vacatur or modification under the FAA’.
42
In Karaha Bodas v. Pertamina, 1009-1023 (2nd Cir. 2007), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration XXXIII
(2008), the court held that merely violation of procedural defence, i.e.: (1) the arbitration panel was improperly constituted; (2) the arbitration procedures were not otherwise in accordance with the agreement;
(3) Pertamina was deprived of its right to present its case; and (4) the arbitral award violated US public
policy may not necessarily justify non-enforcement. See the decision of the US Court Appeals, Second Circuit, 7 September 2007, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration XXXIII (2008), pp. 1009–23.
Jonathan Cotton and Caroline Edward, “Just How Final is “Final and Binding?” http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/39697/just_how_final_is_final_and_binding.pdf, accessed 26 June 2015.
43
John Burritt Mc Arthur, “Growing Pains: Building Arbitrator’s Legitimacy Through Everyday Arbitral
Decision, Responding to Hall Street and The Arbitration Fairness Act: Bolstering Legitimacy Through Everyday Arbitral Decisions” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=john_
mcarthur, accessed 24 June 2015. It is argued that ‘the parties cannot expand the scope of judicial review
by agreement and that courts cannot devise a common law ground for vacating awards for manifest error
of law in dispute falling under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).’
44
Kyocera Corp v. Prudential Bache Trade Services Inc., op.cit. 987 (9th Cir. 2003), in Varady, Barcelo III
and von Mehren, op.cit., pp. 436, 770–771.
39
40
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of the FAA was inadmissible.45 The expansion of grounds for vacating the award was
based on: (a) the lack of substantial evidence for the findings of facts of the arbitral
tribunal and (b) conclusion of law were deemed erroneous.46 However, the exhaustive
approach to the grounds for vacating the awards was not consistently applied by the
courts. In Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,47 the court
enforced the parties’ agreement to expand the grounds for setting aside an award
based on error of law by the arbitrators.48 Moreover, in Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc.,49 the
court held that the parties could not restrict the grounds for review under the FAA50
and could not exclude the implied ground of ‘manifest disregard of the law’.51

Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the Departmental Advisory Committee’s (DAC)
Report on the Arbitration Bill February 1996 Report endorsed ‘substantial injustice’52
as the test for determining a ‘serious irregularity’53 with regard to the arbitral
proceedings.54 This suggests that the court’s review based on ‘serious irregularity’ of
the arbitral proceeding should be ‘designed as a long stop, only available in extreme
cases where the tribunal has gone so wrong in the conduct of the arbitration that
justice calls out for it to be corrected’.55 BTC Bulk Transport Corporation v. Glencore
International AG56 is an example of using substantial injustice as a criterion for
determining whether the due process of law can justify non-enforcement. The court
held that ‘where one party had expected a hearing to take place on one basis and that
expectation was clear to the tribunal, it was substantial injustice for the hearing to
take place on an altogether different basis’.57 Thus, it was considered a contravention
of the duties of arbitral tribunal. This case demonstrates that unfair proceeding of
arbitration process can be deemed a serious irregularity under Section 68 of the
Arbitration Act 1996. Similarly, in Petroships Pte Ltd of Singapore v. Petec Trading and
Investment Corporation of Vietnam and Others58, an arbitral award can be challenged on

Ibid.
Ibid.
47
Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp , 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
48
Ibid.
49
Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc , 343 F.3d 57 (2nd Cir. 2003).
50
See Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
51
The grounds for setting aside the award under Section 10 of the FAA, particularly Sub-Section (3)
regarding the guilty and misconduct of the arbitrators and the exceeded of powers of the arbitrators have
led to an expansive grounds for review of an award.
52
This means that ‘a court’s review on the grounds of ‘serious irregularity’ is only available in extreme
cases where the arbitral tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct of the arbitration that justice calls out
for it to be corrected.’ See Cotton and Edward, op.cit., p. 4.
53
Redfern, et.al., op.cit., p. 149. This is one of the grounds of challenge of the arbitral award, which is
prescribed in Section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 of the United Kingdom. What can be characterised
as irregularity has been enumerated in Article 68 (2) of the Arbitration Act 1996, including: (1) failure to
comply general duties of the arbitral tribunal; (2) exceeding of power; (3) fraud or the violation of public
policy; (4) uncertainty or ambiguity of the award; and (5) irregularity in the conduct of arbitral proceeding.
54
Bruce Harris, Rowan Planterose and Jonathan Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996 : A Commentary, 3rd
ed., (USA: Blackwell, 2003), p. 328. See also Redfern, et.al., op.cit., pp. 148–149.
55
DAC Report February 1996, paragraph 280, in S.R. Luttrell, “Bias Challenges in International Commercial Arbitration, The Need for ‘Real Danger’ Test,” (Dissertation, Murdoch University, Australia, 2008),
p. 41, accessed 24 June 2015, http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/698/2/02Whole.pdf.
56
BTC Bulk Transport Corporation v Glencore International AG, (2006) EWHC 1957 (Comm), in Cotton
and Edward, op.cit., p. 7.
57
Christoph Liebscher, The Healthy Award: Challenge in International Arbitration (The Netherlands:
Kluwer Law International, 2003), p. 148.
58
Petroships Pte Ltd of Singapore v. Petec Trading and Investment Corporation of Vietnam and Others,
EWHC. Comm. 418 (22 May 2001); [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. 348, Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court),
45
46
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the basis of alleged serious irregularity under Section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996.
It is held that where serious irregularity affects the proceedings of the arbitration
process, it is alleged to also cause substantial injustice to one of the disputing parties.
However, there was no clear distinction between the concept of serious irregularity
and the substantial injustice. Since the test of substantial injustice involves the court’s
interference with arbitral proceedings, it preserves the court’s power to intervene in
arbitration proceedings.

The Swiss Federal Court adopted a more restrictive approach in Transport en
Handelsmaatchappij ‘Vekoma’ B.V. (Netherlands) v. Maran Coal Corp. (USA).59 It held
that the judicial review of facts should only be limited to ‘substantiated objection
on the basis of non-observance of procedural guarantees set by law or incompatible
with procedural ordre public.’60 In that case, the defendant stated that as the buyer
(Maran) did not meet the 30-day contractual deadline for resorting to arbitration,
this confined the lack of jurisdiction of the arbitrators.61 The court also held that the
absence of factual (empirical) examination of the cargo contract had authorised the
court’s legal control over the award.62 This case demonstrated that the court owes
deference to the findings of facts of the arbitrators in the arbitral proceedings.63 This
is reasonable since Article 190 (2) of the Federal Statute on Private International
Law (twelfth chapter: International Arbitration) provides the action of jurisdiction
over the award.64 Article 190 (2) of the Federal Statute on Private International Law
provides that:
1. if the sole arbitrator was not properly appointed or if the arbitral tribunal was not
properly constituted;
2. if the arbitral tribunal wrongly accepted or declined jurisdiction;
3. if the arbitral tribunal decision went beyond the claims submitted to it, or failed to
decide one of the items of the claim;
4. if the principle of equal treatment of the parties of the right of the parties to be
heard was violated; or
5. if the award is incompatible with public policy. 65
Principally, this provision concerning the lack of jurisdiction as the legal basis of
the application for annulment is parallel with that in the French CCP. This is based on
the exhaustive nature of Article 1502 of the CCP providing that:

An appeal against the decision, which grants recognition or enforcement, will be
available only in the following cases:
1. if the arbitrator has ruled upon the matter without an arbitration agreement or
based on a void and lapsed agreement.

May 22, 2001, (2001) 2 Lloyd’s Law Report 348, available at http://www.simic.net.cn/upload/2008-0..
C.7/20080701105032238.pdf.
59
Transport en Handelsmaatchappij ‘Vekoma’ B.V. (Netherlands) v. Maran Coal Corp. (USA), 673 (Swiss
Fed. Trib. 1995), 1996 (4) ASA Bull. For a detailed commentary on this decision, see Varady, Barcelo III and
von Mehren, op.cit., p. 761.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Varady, Barcelo III and von Mehren, op.cit., p. 761.
65
Article 190 (2) of the Federal Statute on Private International Law—Twelfth Chapter: International
Arbitration regarding Finality, Actions for annulment.
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2. If the arbitration tribunal has been unlawfully constituted or the sole arbitrator
has been unlawfully designated;
3. if the arbitrator has ruled upon the matter contrary to the assignment given to
him;
4. if the adversarial principle has not been respected;
5. if the recognition or enforcement is contrary to public international order.
The important issue is sub-section (5) of this article. Under Article 1502 (5) of this
Act, the violation of international public order has become the sole grounds for refusal
of enforcement of international awards. This provision seeks to minimize the court’s
judicial review upon the facts and law as found by the arbitral tribunal.66 Accordingly,
a court which has to decide whether an award violates international public policy has
no authority to review the merits of the award.67
B. No Merits Review68 of Arbitral Awards

Broadly speaking, the non-enforcement of awards is justifiable only if there
are serious procedural defects but not further into the substance of the dispute.69
Article V of the NYC is confined to a broad scheme of procedural review70 based on
procedural fairness and arbitral impartiality instead of substantive review.71 This
means that the court’s review of awards is not designed to deal with the substance
of the awards.72 However, does this also mean that judicial review on the merits of
the award should be totally excluded? Despite the fact that an international award is
final and conclusive, judicial review on the merits of the award remains.73 Although
merits review is inconsistent with the principle of party autonomy as the fundamental
basis of arbitration, it would seem unavoidable with regard to substantive grounds
for challenge of enforcement.74 It is arguable that since arbitration is a contractual
agreement, thus the supremacy of party autonomy should be left to the party to
decide whether they do or do not want judicial review of the merits. 75 Accordingly,
66
Jean Louis Devolve, Gerald Pointon and Jean Roche, French Arbitration Law and Practice, A Dynamic
Civil Law Approach to International Arbitration (The Netherlands : Kluwer Law International, 2009), pp.
254-255.
67
Ibid., p. 256.
68
It mostly concerns the issue of whether the arbitrator has a mistake of fact or of law in issuing the
award. See Varady, Barcelo III. and von Mehren, op.cit., p. 231.
69
Ibid.
70
This review closely deals with the procedure of arbitral proceeding, which has been enumerated in
Article V (1) of the NYC.
71
This review relates to subject matter of the award, but it is limited to arbitrability and the public
policy exception.
72
Substantive review of the award is only based on the public policy exception and non-arbitrability,
which are prescribed in Article V (2) of the NYC. It should be distinguished from the judicial review with
regard to the requirement of natural justice and the judicial review concerning the merits of the award.
See Margaret L. Moses (1), The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (UK: Cambridge, 2012), p. 231.
73
Article 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides statutory grounds for judicial review on the
vague concept of corruption, fraud or undue means, misconduct of arbitrators, or arbitrator’s exceeding
power.
74
The substantive defence in the form of arbitrability (Article V (2) (a) of the NYC) and public policy
(Article V (2) (b) of the NYC) are confined to merits review since it is difficult to examine the enforcement
of an award that would be contrary to both defences without examining the merits of the award.
75
Moses (1), op.cit., p. 237.
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the court has been permitted to reassess the fact of the case if the contravention
of those substantive defences would not be apparent from a mere review of the
award.76 In the US, for example, the challenge of awards based on ‘corruption, fraud
or undue means,’77 ‘partiality,’78 ‘misconduct of arbitrator’,79 and ‘exceeding power of
arbitrator’80 has inevitably triggered the court to review the merits of the awards. It is
argued that non-statutory grounds for challenge e.g. ‘manifest disregard the law’ have
also been negatively deemed as a disguise means of imposing the merits review of the
awards. Similarly, the vague concept of ‘serious irregularity’ under Section 68 of the
English Arbitration Act 1996 may also lead to the merits review of the awards. Since
the examination of these grounds for challenge involves the substance of evidence,
merits review seems to be inevitable. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co.81 demonstrated merits review based on alleged ‘partiality’ as grounds
for setting aside the award. In this case, the US Supreme Court vacated the award
based on alleged partiality notwithstanding that the arbitrator was entirely fair and
impartial. 82

In France, however, the scope of judicial review of an international award on public
policy ground has undergone a significant shift. The court has adopted a very limited
scope of judicial review of international awards. In SNF SAS SA v. Dutch Company
Cytec Industries BV (Cytec) 83, the court only had extrinsic control in determining
the violation of international public policy. Therefore, there was no need for merits
review of the award. This decision exemplifies a strong prima facie evidence of the
finality and enforceability of international awards. This approach is also adopted by
the Federal Court of Australia.
C. Statutory Basis versus Non-statutory Basis for Setting Aside of Arbitral
Awards

How does the enforcement court verify the existence of the grounds for challenging
enforcement? In most jurisdictions, statutory ground provisions have become major
sources of the basic standard of judicial review.84 Apart from this statutory provision, it
has been argued that contractual agreement has also significantly influenced the scope
of judicial review.85 Within this context, the parties have tried to contractually expand
International Law Association (ILA) Resolution 2002, Recommendation 3 (c).
Section 10 (a) (1) of the FAA.
78
Section 10 (a) (2) of the FAA.
79
Section 10 (a) (3) of the FAA.
80
Section 10 (a) (4) of the FAA.
81
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co .,393 US 145,149 (1963).
82
Ibid.
83
SNF SAS SA v Dutch Company Cytec Industries BV (Cytec), Court of Appeal, Paris, First Chamber,
23 March 2006, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration XXXII (2007) pp. 282–9, cited in Emmanuel Gaillard,
“Extent of Court Review of Public Policy” New York Law Journal Vol. 237 No. 5 (April 2007): 2, http://
www.shearman.com/files/Publication/6ce97c62-ca6f-4bb0-807e-af4bedc1ea4b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ec0e73f8-6fe4-48e6-a689-b35c94886708/IA_NYLJ%20Extent%20of%20Court%20Review_040308_16.pdf.
84
Statutory basis for refusing enforcement of arbitral awards in most countries mainly adopts Article
V of the NYC. Non-statutory grounds for setting aside arbitration awards are distinguished from judicially
created grounds for vacating the award. See Christopher R. Drahozal, “Codifying Manifest Disregard,” Nevada Law Journal Vol. 8 (2007-2008): 234.
85
See Gateway Technologies v. MCI Telecommunication Corp., loc.cit., in which the US Court held the
additional non-statutory grounds for annulment based on error of law.
76
77
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the scope of judicial review beyond the state’s statutory provisions.86 This exemplifies
a legal tension between freedom of the contract principle and preservation of the
integrity of the arbitral process. This shows that the court, in some circumstances,
has allowed the review of the award based on additional non-statutory grounds for
vacating the award.87 In the US, for example, different positions have been taken by
the courts in determining whether judicial review can be altered by the parties.88 The
emergence of non-statutory grounds for judicial review stems from, or at least reflects,
freedom of the contract principle.89 Nevertheless, it seems desirable to restrict the
grounds for vacating the award in order to avoid an excessively wide approach to
the scope of review.90 For instance, the US court requires ‘explicit language’91 and
‘clear intention’92 of the application of non-statutory standard of review based on the
parties’ agreement.
D. Case Illustration: Public Policy Exception vs. Manifest Disregard of the Law

The arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law has undermined the exhaustive
nature of Article V of the NYC. Neither the Model Law nor the NYC has expressly
adopted this ground for non-enforcement or annulment of the awards. However, its
application may overlap with an expansive approach to the public policy exception.
Accordingly, the parties may raise arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law under the
guise of public policy exception of Article V (2) (b) of the NYC. It may also be raised
under the due process exception, particularly the arbitrator’s excess of power. In this
regard, two important issues are identified: firstly, does mere error of law suffice to
justify non-enforcement under the ground of manifest disregard of the law? Secondly,
is manifest disregard considered as a separate ground for review or it is merely
derived from statutory grounds for non-enforcement or annulment of the award? It is
suggested that a narrow approach to the public policy exception and pro-enforcement
policy of the NYC discourages the courts to conduct merits review of the awards on
the basis of arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law. In this regard, mere arbitrator’s

86
This exemplifies a legal tension between the freedom of contract principle and the preserving of the
integrity of arbitral process.
87
In Wilko v. Swan, 346 US 427 (1953), for example, judicially created basis for setting aside an arbitral
award known as manifest disregard of the law is exist in addition to the statutory basis listed in the FAA.
See Robert M. Hall, “Manifest Disregard of Law or Fact or Both ?” http://www.robertmhall.com/articles/
ManDisrArt.htm.
88
See Cable Connection v DIRECTV Inc., No 147767, Cal. LEXIS, 25 August 2008, in which the US Court
held that error of law had been used as a non-statutory standard of judicial review of an award. Compared to UHC Management Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998); See also Crowell v
Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found, 115 Cal. Rptr 2d 810 (2002), in which the US Courts prohibited the expansion
of judicial review of awards. See Eric Van Ginkel, “Reframing the Dilemma of Contractually Judicial Review:
Arbitral Appeal v Vacatur,” Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal Vol. 3, No. 2 (2003),: 164; See Hall
Street Associates L.L.C. v. Mattel Inc., 552 US, 128 S, Ct. 1396, 1404–5 (2008), in which the US Court held that
the parties could not expand judicial review beyond the statutory standard of Article 10 of the FAA, cited
in Michael Geibelson and David Martinez, “California Supreme Court Expands Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards,” http://www.rkmc.com/California-Supreme-Court-Expands-Judicial-Review-of-ArbitrationAwards.htm, accessed 25 June 2015. These cases demonstrated inconsistent approach to the application of
non-statutory grounds for judicial review of awards.
89
There has been legal tension between freedom of contract principle and the integrity of international arbitration.
90
Compared to the case of Wilko v. Swan.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid. See also MACTEC Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2005).
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error of law or of fact may not suffice to justify non-enforcement unless it may lead
to serious procedural irregularities. An exhaustive nature of Article V of the NYC also
discourages municipal courts to consider manifest disregard of the law as additional
grounds for review of the awards.

The following cases illustrate a comparison of the Indonesian court’s approach
with other countries’ approach.
1. The Indonesian Approach

The Indonesian Arbitration Law i.e. the Law No. 30 of 1999 has not comprehensively
pertained to the adoption of the competence-competence principle. This means that
the intervention of courts as regard to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards continues to exist. 93 In addition to this issue, Article 70 of the Law also
allows judicial review of the award on the basis of forgery, concealment of documents,
falsification.94 However, the problem that continues to exist is whether the grounds for
annulment of the award based on the Article 70 represents an exhaustive list or not.
95
Does this mean that the courts have legal authority to review the award based on
error of law? The Indonesian arbitration law does not expressly provide grounds for
appeal based on error of law or of fact.96 Ironically, in practice, it may provide judicial
review of the award on the grounds that an arbitrator made a manifest disregard of
the law. This can be noted from the court’s decision in the Karaha Bodas case.97

In Karaha Bodas v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara
(Pertamina)98, one of the underlying rationales of the Indonesian annulment of the
Geneva award is manifest disregard of the law.99 The Indonesian District Court of
Central Jakarta annulled the award and considered manifest disregard of the law as
a ground for review. The court held that an error of arbitral tribunal to interpret the
concept of ‘force majeure’ under the Indonesian Civil Code as the governing law of
the contracts e.g. JOC and ESC was contrary to both Indonesian law and the parties’
agreement, constituted contravention to Indonesian mandatory rules or illegality,
and therefore fell within the public policy exception.100 The arbitrator’s manifest
disregard of the law was also raised under the guise of the due process exception, in
particular arbitrator’s excess of power, at least to the extent of the overlap between
this exception and the public policy exception. 101 This implies that the arbitrator’s
manifest disregard of the law was incorporated into the public policy exception. In

See article 66 point (d) and (e) of the Indonesian Arbitration Act.
Sudargo Gautama, Arbitrase Luar Negeri dan Pemakaian Hukum Indonesia (Bandung: Citra Aditya
Bakti, 2004), p. 347.
95
Ibid., p. 348. See also the general elucidation of the Indonesian Arbitration Act providing that Chapter VII regarding the grounds for annulment of arbitral awards under this Act is non-exhaustive.
96
Ibid.
97
In this case, the District Court of Central Jakarta granted the vacatur of the Geneva award on the
basis of manifest disregard of the law since the issuance of the Geneva award did not comply with the
Indonesian Contract Law (Burgerlijk Wetboek). The failure of the arbitral tribunal in interpreting the term
force majeure under the Indonesian Civil Code as the governing law of the contracts had been considered
manifest disregard of the law, thus the arbitrators had exceeded their power and it also violated Indonesian
public policy because it was contrary to Indonesian substantive law. See the rationale of the Decision of the
District Court of Central Jakarta No 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST, in Gautama, op.cit., pp. 274-278.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid., pp. 276-277.
101
Ibid.
93
94
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doing so, the court effectively broadened the meaning of public policy in the context
of annulment, thus departing from an exhaustive nature of the grounds for nonenforcement under Article 66 of the Indonesian Arbitration Act and Article V of the
NYC.

The District Court of Central Jakarta did not distinguish the concept of manifest
disregard of law from a mere error of law or failure to apply the law – for instance,
‘where the tribunal consciously ignored the law by reaching legal conclusions beyond
the principles of Indonesian law as the governing law of the contracts. They tend
to equate the concept of manifest disregard of the law and mere error of law. The
Indonesian annulment of the award exemplifies the expansion of public policy in
the context of annulment. Specifically, the court has legal authority to interfere with
international awards which manifestly disregard the Indonesian substantive law.
This also illustrates the open ended and non-exhaustive nature of public policy in
Indonesia. By establishing the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of law as new grounds
within the grounds for annulment, the court has broadened the scope of public
policy as ground for annulment and non-enforcement. In this context, the arbitrator’s
manifest disregard of the law has been used as a basis to review an international
award and influenced award finality in Indonesia.

In the Karaha Bodas, the Indonesian District Court held that the arbitral tribunal did
not only make an error of law in reaching the award, but it ‘manifestly disregarded’102
the Indonesian substantive law as the governing law of the contract.103 Not only did
this case concern itself with the question of whether there was substantial evidence
or reasons supporting a conclusion of law of the arbitrator’s decision, but it was also
confined to manifest disregard of the law of the tribunal:104

“The tribunal did not make a mistake in applying or construing Indonesian law
but that the tribunal consciously ignored that law, substituting its own rules
and reaching legal conclusions that were not and could not be supported by the
controlling principles of the Indonesian law. Accordingly, it also violated the parties’
agreements.”105

Accordingly, the enforcement of the Geneva award would be contrary to public
policy due to its contravention to the mandatory provisions of Indonesian substantive
law.106 The decision of the District Court of Central Jakarta in Karaha Bodas case is
an example of judicially created ground for reviewing an award based on ‘manifestly
disregard of the law’,107 which was equated with the violation of public policy
exception.108 This case also exemplifies the expansive approach to the judicial review
102
A similar approach is also adopted in Wilko v. Swan, 346 US 427 (1953), in which the US court
added ‘manifest disregard of the law’ as a basis for setting aside an arbitral award. See William W. Park (2),
“Amending the Federal Arbitration Act,” American Review of International Arbitration Vol. 13 (2002): 9-10.
103
Gautama, op.cit., p. 348.
104
Ibid.
105
Ibid., Pp. 349–350.
106
Based on Article 1337 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), a contract which is in contrary to law, public order and good morals can be deemed invalid because it contains illegal cause (unlawful
purpose). Accordingly, it cannot be enforced in Indonesia.
107
Based on this concept, ‘a party seeking to establish manifest disregard of the law sufficient to warrant setting aside an arbitral award must demonstrate that the arbitrators appreciated the existence and
applicability of a controlling legal rule but intentionally decided not to apply it.’ See Christopher R. Drahozal, op.cit., p. 237.
108
Gautama, op.cit., pp. 349-350. This means that the Swiss arbitral tribunal did not only make an error of law in reaching the award, but it explicitly disregarded it notwithstanding the arbitrator knew that
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of the awards since the court’s decision allows the award to be challenged based
on a standard approach legal error. Consequently, the courts have also challenged
the exhaustive nature of Article 66 of the Indonesian Arbitration Law stating that
an arbitrator’s manifest disregard or error of law may fall within the public policy
exception in Article 66 (c) and grounds for annulment in Article 70 of the Act. The
lack of exclusivity of Article 70 and Article 66 (c) of the Indonesian arbitration law has
been interpreted broadly to allow awards to be challenged if they violate substantive
provisions of law. The authority to review the merits under these provisions may lead
the enforceability of international awards in Indonesia to be more uncertain.
2. The International Approach

By way of comparison, some jurisdictions other than Indonesia generally
adhere to the restrictive standards of review of arbitration awards. This approach
is significantly different from the Indonesian approach. In the US, for example, the
courts tend to eliminate the judicial created ground for review such as ‘manifest
disregard of the law based on exhaustive nature of the grounds for vacating an award
and the finality of award.’109 In Wilko v. Swan110, the US court held that mere error of
law is not sufficient to justify non-enforcement unless an error is so extreme that it
amounts to manifest disregard of the law. 111 ‘The interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to
judicial review for error in interpretations.’112 The US court delimited and narrowly
construed the scope of judicial review of error of law by distinguishing between mere
error of law and manifest disregard of the law. 113 This also means that not all of the
arbitrator’s error of law qualify as manifest disregard of the law.
Manifest disregard “clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law. The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and
instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.” 114

Similarly, in Hall Street Association v. Mattel, Inc.,115 the US court held that the
grounds for vacating an award under the FAA is exhaustive, thus it should be construed
narrowly and that non-statutory grounds for vacating an award did not sufficiently
constitute a ground for refusing enforcement.116 The court’s decision in this case

the parties had chosen the Indonesian Law as an applicable law of the contract. Compared to the distinction
between ‘error of law’ and ‘manifest disregard of law’ in Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp.,
427 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2005).
109
Wilko v. Swan, loc.cit..
110
Ibid.
111
Margaret L. Moses (2), “Arbitration Law : Who’s in Charge ?” Seton Hall Law Review Vol 40 (3 March
2010): 165-166, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287303.
112
Robert N Rapp, “The Manifest Disregard Standard for Vacatur: Is Hall Street One Way?” http://
works.bepress.com/robert_rapp/1, accessed 26 December 2014.
113
See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. Et Al v. Animal Feeds International Corp., Supreme Court of the United States,
Certiori to the United State Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, No 08-1198, April 21, 2010, http://
www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1198.pdf, p. 5.
114
Michael H LeRoy, “Are Arbitrators Above the Law ? The “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard”
Boston College Law Review Vol. 52 (2011): 187, accessed 24 June 2014, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1755066.
115
Hall Street Association v. Mattel, Inc , 128 S. Ct. 1396. (2008), in Gary Born (2), “Manifest Disregard
After Hall Street,” http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/03/09/manifest-disregard-after-hallstreet/, accessed 25 June 2015.
116
Ibid., p. 139.
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illustrated that parties could not contractually expand judicial review. Although the
court in Hall Street case held that manifest disregard of the law is beyond the scope
of exclusive FAA grounds for judicial review of awards, it did not obviously reject
manifest disregard of the law as an independent ground for review generally. 117 The
court had not clearly decided the legal status of manifest disregard of the law. 118 The
issue of whether manifest disregard was included in the grounds for vacatur under
the FAA or as an independent ground for review had not been decided by the courts.119
This approach was also adopted in Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Bacon,120 in which
the US Court of Appeals abandoned manifest disregard of the law as non-statutory
ground for reviewing an award due to the exclusivity of the FAA.121 In Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.122, however, the US Court vacated an award
because the arbitral tribunal erroneously made a decision regarding class arbitration
procedures without referring to the contractual basis of the parties.123
The arbitral tribunal failed to perform choice of law analysis to identify and apply a
contractual rule of decision for resolving the issue. The award authorizing class arbitration should be vacated because the arbitration panel had merely imposed its own
policy choice rather than identifying and applying a rule of decision derived from
either the FAA or maritime of New York Law as the governing law of the dispute.124

The court held that such an error was sufficient to vacate the award under Section 10
(a) (4) of the FAA. This provision enables the district court to vacate an arbitral award
due to the arbitrators exceeding their authority.125 Therefore, since the arbitration
clause of the contract was silent with respect to class arbitration i.e. no agreement
had been concluded on that issue, the arbitral tribunal was manifestly disregard of
the law i.e. the award was made in manifest disregard of choice of law requirement
and of contract principles under maritime law.126 The tribunal decision regarding
class arbitration procedures could not be inferred because of the in-existence of
contractual basis regarding class actions. Hence, the arbitration panel’s ruling must
be reversed.127 While the courts’ decisions in Wilko and Hall Street declined to decide
the status of manifest disregard, the court in Stolt-Nielsen did make clear that the
arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law was considered as a ground for vacatur.
This case illustrates that there is judicial recognition that the arbitrator’s error of law
may constitute arbitrators’ exceeded of power, which is grounds for review of awards
under the FAA.
Although the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of law may be grounds or vacatur,
it is nevertheless construed narrowly. The underlying rationales for such restrictive
approach appear threefold. Firstly, the vacatur of an award may be successful if it

Rapp, op.cit., p. 2.
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suffices the requirements as follows: (1) the arbitrators are aware of a governing legal
principle but choose to ignore it or refuse to apply it; (2) the law which is not applied
is well defined, explicit and clearly applicable to the case.128 This means that the US
courts are reluctant to merits review of awards. Secondly, the exhaustive nature of the
NYC and FAA indicates that arbitrator’s manifest disregard of law is not a separate or
additional ground for vacatur.129 Accordingly, non-statutory grounds for setting aside
an award must be abandoned. Thirdly, the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of law does
not rise to the level of contravening public policy, but it is more likely shorthand for a
statutory ground under the FAA, in particular Section 10 (a) (4) which allows a court
to set aside on the basis of the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 130
In M & C. Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co.,131 the US courts claimed that ‘review for
a manifest disregard of the law’ could not be pigeonholed into the ‘violation of public
policy basis for refusal to confirm an award contained in Article V (2) (b) of the NYC.’132
This case suggests that the US court may not view ‘manifest disregard of the law’ as
falling within the public policy exception, thus it provides for judicial review on more
restrictive grounds. In Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes,133 however, the
Indian courts expanded the scope of judicial review of the awards by equating review
on public policy grounds to an error of law or manifestly illegal (patent illegality).

Similarly, the United Kingdom (UK) Arbitration Act 1996 expressly provides an
appeal on point of law. Article 69 of this Act provides that ‘unless otherwise agreed by
the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and
to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a question of law arising out of an award made
in the proceedings’. Consequently, judicial review of the award on the basis error of
law is admissible. However, it is only applied in extreme cases, whereby the decision
of the arbitral tribunal is obviously wrong or open to serious doubt (substantial
injustice).134 A mere error of law or of fact may not fall within the concept of manifest
disregard of the law. In the case of Lombard-Knight & Anor v. Rainstorm Pictures
Inc 135 the English Court of Appeal refused challenge of the award under the ground of
formalism. In other words, the court refused non-enforcement purely on the basis of
form instead of substance. This decision demonstrates the limitation of discretionary
power of courts in refusing enforcement of foreign awards. This also exemplifies the
adoption of pro-enforcement of the New York Convention.
In Australia, the International Arbitration Act (IAA) 1974 adopts more exhaustive
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grounds for setting aside the awards. Section 34 of the Act adopts the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.136 This provision provides no
right of appeal against international awards. In regards to domestic awards, however,
the state commercial arbitration (Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 [CAA]) provides
more expansive grounds for judicial review such as manifest error of law, misconduct
of arbitrators and inadequate reasons of the awards.137 In Oil Basins Limited v. BHP
Biliton Ltd.,138 for instance, the Court of Appeals vacated the domestic award based
on error of law and misconduct due to the failure of the majority of the arbitrators
to give adequate reasons.139 This case exemplifies the expansive standards of review
of domestic arbitration award by adopting inadequate reasons as grounds for setting
aside the award. France, as a European civil law state, provides for exhaustive grounds
for setting aside the award on the basis of the violation of fundamental rights and of
public international order.140 Even if an award is applied for annulment, the court of
appeal has no competent authority to review the merits of the arbitrators’ findings
of fact or of law. 141 Manifest error of the reason of an award does not necessarily
render the vacatur of the award. The narrow approach to the public policy exception
has discouraged substantive review of an award. 142 Thus, it will also promote the
finality and enforceability of the awards. A mere error of facts/law cannot justify nonenforcement of foreign awards. This can be noted from the case of Uganda Telecom
Ltd v. Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd143, in which case the Federal Court of Australia held that
enforcement of foreign award could only be refused in very limited grounds. In other
words, this approach exemplifies the prima facie approach to the enforceability of
foreign award. The Federal Court of Australia adopts the principle of no merits review.
Therefore an international arbitral award will be enforced in Australia without the
need to reopen the substance of the dispute in court.

Non-interventionist and pro-enforcement approaches to the enforceability of
foreign awards are also adopted by the Singapore Appeal Court. In the case of BLC
and others v. BLB and another (30 July 2014) (BLC v. BLB),144 the Singapore Court of
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Appeal reversed the Singapore High Court’s decision to set aside an arbitral award
on the grounds of a breach of natural justice. This decision demonstrates that there
is minimal court’s intervention in the enforcement of foreign awards and therefore
strongly supports the pro-enforcement of the New York Convention.

IV. Conclusion

This article finds that the most fundamental basis of the NYC refers to the proenforcement policy. This means the prevailing view is that the scope of judicial
review of foreign arbitral awards is confined to an extremely limited judicial review
in order to minimize parochialism and chauvinism. A broad scope of judicial review
may impose more onerous conditions to the enforcement of international awards,
which is in conflict with Article III of the NYC. Despite the fact that the NYC does not
expressly specify the grounds for setting aside the awards, the scope of judicial review
may vary in different states. The lesson that can be learnt from this study is that
international practices of commercial arbitration has implemented more restrictive
grounds of review of arbitral awards. Interestingly, most of the international cases
analyzed in this article demonstrate a restrictive/exhaustive grounds for vacating an
award. Therefore, the shift of many jurisdictions approach to the pro enforcement
policy is a significant signal and a promising development to promote the finality and
enforceability of the arbitral awards.
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